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Abstract 
This paper studies the relevance of institutional differences in the way 
knowledge determines productivity for a set of 21 OECD countries in the second half of 
the XXth century. The relationship between Total Factor Productivity (TFP, from 
hereafter) and knowledge related variables is reconsidered after controlling for a new 
set of institutional variables. The new set has been specifically tailored to measure the 
post WWII institutional framework characterized by the development of the Welfare 
State and by an increasing exposure of countries to international competence. We 
estimate the differential impact of innovation variables over productivity during the 
Golden Age as compared to the whole period 1953-2007, after controlling by these 
specific institutional variables. Additionally, we distinguish the particular impact of these 
relationships for five groups of countries following Amable (2006) classification, which 
differ in the degree of development of post WWII institutions. Our results suggest that 
some of these institutions determine the response of TFP to the knowledge variables 
and that the resulting elasticities are higher during the Golden Age. When countries are 
grouped according to their similarities in this set of institutions, we find significant 
differences among them. In general, there are not significant differences between the 
different groups and the market oriented economies with regard to the elasticity of TFP 
to the indoor innovation, with the exception of Japan. However, the results suggest that 
in Anglo-Saxon market oriented economies, international spillovers of technology have 
a higher impact on TFP. Additionally, in continental and Mediterranean European 
countries and Japan, TFP is more sensitive to human capital accumulation than in the 
market-oriented economies (the US and the UK).  
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1. Introduction. 
In the last decades, the role of institutions and their adaptability to make the 
economies more prone to technological change has been at the core of the 
economic debate in Europe. This debate deals about the reasons that could 
explain why European countries, Japan and the U.S. have performed so 
differently in the last decades and why they have displayed differences in their 
adaptability to the new challenges brought by globalization, the development of 
the Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) and the emergence of 
the “knowledge based economy”. 
The issue arises after observing that the trajectory followed by the 
Western European economies and Japan with regard to the US has reversal in 
in the last two decades, as compared with the one observed after the WWII. In 
the Golden Age period the Western European countries and Japan experienced 
fast growth rates letting them to catch-up with the U.S., by contrary the U.S. 
remained stagnant and lost positions in terms of industrial competitiveness in 
the world economy. However, in the last two decades Europe and Japan had 
performed quite poorly with regard to the U.S., that has enjoyed the highest 
rates of productivity growth since the end of the WWII. This vigorous growth has 
pushed the North-American economy again at the forefront of the new 
knowledge economy.  
Some scholars attribute the gap in productivity between the countries on 
either side of the Atlantic to differences in the degree of adoption and 
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development of ICT technologies.1 The U.S., with remarkably stable growth 
rates throughout the second half of the last century, has preserved its 
technological leadership by pioneering the development and dissemination of 
ICT technologies.2 For the European countries, without overlooking the 
influences of other non-ICT determinants, differences in ICT adoption explains a 
big proportion of the gulf in productivity with respect to the U.S. Following a 
growth accounting approach, the low share of the ICT producing industries in 
total output and the low rates of investment in new ICT equipment in Europe 
seem to be the main sources of the disappointing performance of the European 
economies.  
Furthermore, for Timmer and van Ark (2005) the poorer penetration of 
the ICT technologies prevents European economies developing the 
technological spillovers derived from this sort of new General Purpose 
Technology. With low levels of investment in ICT equipment is difficult to start 
up the “spillover effects” and to observe all those benefits, in terms of multifactor 
productivity, that experience the industries by using the new technology and 
that provoke changes in firms organizations, development of new products, 
services and processes, and a continuous up-grading of the labour force.  
Additionally, a further the exploration of the causes of the European and 
Japanese slowdown in productivity considers that differences in the institutional 
framework are in the roots of the low dissemination in Europe and Japan of any 
kind of new technologies, not only the ICTs. According to this interpretation, 
countries need to develop higher levels of knowledge competence and to train a 
                                                            
1  There is a vast literature that stresses the still poor assimilation in Europe of the ICT 
technologies as compared with the U.S. (Van Ark et al, 2003; Colecchia and Schreyer, 2001; 
Vijselar and Albers, 2002; Timmer and Van Ark, 2005; Timmer et al, 2003 and 2010). 
2 The increasing use of ICT equipment explains the acceleration of productivity growth in the 
U.S. since 1995 (Oliner and Sichel, 2000; Jorgenson and Stiroh, 2001; and, Oulton, 2012). 
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more skilled labour force to better accommodate new technologies (Mowery 
and Rosenberg, 2000).  
The “knowledge based economy” refers to the idea that knowledge 
creation and diffusion play a more important role in competitiveness and 
economic growth than it used to be in previous technological eras. In the new 
competitive conditions innovation is crucial for the survival of firms, which have 
to adapt continuously to the changing market conditions and to frequent 
modifications of the production methods. In this new economy, the ability of 
firms to innovate will depend in a great extent of the availability of a more 
flexible workforce in terms of its ability to upgrade permanently its skills and of 
its willingness to mobility. The knowledge based economy demands more 
flexible labour and capital markets to ensure the permanent adaptability of the 
firms to the changing conditions.  
Some works consider that the lower adaptability of Europe and Japan to 
the new competitive conditions lay on the characteristics of their institutions. 
These institutions, classified as “coordinated capitalism” and characterized by 
different sorts of arrangements between the State, the firms and the workers, 
are exemplified by the Japanese model of industrialization after the WWII, the 
French indicative planning of the 1960s, the German style codetermination in 
the 1970s, among other This kind of institutions that were appropriate for 
catching up with the U.S. during the Golden Age, could have become less 
adequate in a new economy where innovation and adaptability are crucial for 
economic growth. Thus, as Aghion and Howitt (2006) point out, to stay at the 
forefront of technological advancement, some aspects in the society, such as 
the resources devoted to investment in high-quality education, require 
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improvement, as well as the labour and product markets should seek to remove 
binding rigidities. 
This paper analyses the relevance of institutional differences in the way 
knowledge related variables determine productivity for a set of 21 OECD 
countries in the second half of the XXth century. Our empirical analysis follows 
Coe et al. (2009) approach, where the relationship between TFP and domestic 
knowledge accumulation, international spillovers and human capital is 
estimated after controlling for institutional variables. However, we extend the set 
of institutional variables uses. In particular, we build a new set of institutional 
variables specifically tailored to measure the post WWII institutional framework 
characterized by the development of the Welfare State and by an increasing 
exposure of countries to international competence. Further, we will also account 
for the differences across countries by grouping them according to the degree 
of development of the institutional variables and following Amable (2003) 
classification.  
 
2. Data and Total Factor Productivity. 
We use Coe and Helpman (1995) specification, extended by Engelbrecht 
(1997), to add a human capital variable, and by Coe et al. (2009) to control for 
institutional variables, to explore the role of the institutional variables in the long-
run evolution of TFP for 21 OECD countries throughout the second half of the 
20th century. The institutional variables we propose account for the “coordinated 
capitalism” framework (Eichengreen, 2007) that was established (with different 
extent) in the advanced countries after the WWII. We will also introduce the 
following variables: domestic innovation, measured by the stock of domestic 
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patents; international technology diffusion, measured by the stock of foreign 
patents diffused through trade; and human capital. Equation 1 shows our 
empirical model: 
logTFPit   0  d log Sitd mf mit log Sitf  H log Hit   it         (1) 
where TFPit is total factor productivity for country i and year t; Sitd is the stock of 
domestic patents; Sitf  is the stock of foreign knowledge (obtained as a weighted 
sum of the domestic stocks of patents of the trading partners of a country); mit is 
the propensity to import (measured by imports as a fraction of GDP); Hit is the 
domestic stock of human capital; and εit is a disturbance term. The model is 
estimated both with and without mit. As Coe and Helpman (1995) propose, the 
transmission of international technology spillovers through trade may be 
proportional to the degree of openness of the country. This may only partially be 
captured by the foreign stock of knowledge as it is constructed. They therefore 
propose including an interaction between the foreign stock of knowledge and 
the country’s average propensity to import, to account explicitly for the degree 
of openness of the economy.  
Following Coe et al. (2009), we will extend specification (1) to account for 
the institutional framework (i.e., the “coordinated capitalism” institutions) 
proposed in this research. We will introduce the institutional variables together 
with domestic innovation, foreign innovation and human capital variables, to 
analyse the effect of the institutional framework on TFP. Further, we will also 
study the above relationship during the Golden Age.  
Finally, we will research if there are differential patterns for different 
groups of countries, according to Amable (2003) classification (Market-based 
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Anglo-Saxon economies, Social-Democratic model, Continental European 
model, Mediterranean model, Nordic model and Asian model).  
2.1. Knowledge related variables and TFP. 
We use annual data for 21 OECD countries for the period 1953 to 20073. In 
particular, for each country, we calculate TFP, the domestic stock of knowledge, 
the foreign stock of knowledge and human capital. The TFP is taken from the 
Penn World Table 8.0 (Feenstra, Inklaar and Timmer, 2013). TFP growth was 
positive in every country and grew a 66 per cent, on average, for the 21 
countries. The highest growth was achieved in Japan, Finland and Greece and 
the lowest in Canada and Norway. 
To build the series of domestic and foreign stock of knowledge, we use 
the flow of total patents applied for annually in each national office and 
registered in the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) Statistics 
Database. Additionally, we take into account the patents directly applied for at 
the European Patent Office (EPO) since 1977. Despite this information being 
readily available, however, the use of patents statistics has some drawbacks. 
One of main shortcomings is the concern about the comparability of patent data 
over time and across countries. Mansfield (1986) finds no significant changes in 
the propensity to patent over time in the U.S. and other countries. Some authors 
consider that, since the Paris Convention of 1883 harmonised patenting rules, 
the number of claims per patent is approximately the same across all countries 
except for Japan (Okada, 1992). However, Lerner (2000 and 2002) points out 
some significant differences between countries concerning to patent fees, 
                                                            
3 The countries are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, United Kingdom and United States. 
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structure of patents renewals, patent office practices, etc. As such differences 
persist, even after the Paris Convention, this author suggests that the patents 
series should be corrected. We have addressed this problem by calculating a 
scaling factor for each country in a similar way than in Okada (1992) for Japan. 
In the Appendix 1 of Sanchis et al (2015) you can find more details about the 
way of calculating this scaling factor. We use the perpetual inventory method to 
construct knowledge stocks. The domestic stock of knowledge is calculated by 
cumulative patent applications in each country using a 5% depreciation rate.4  
The increase in the domestic stock of patents is smoother than the rise in 
TFP. Japan and Ireland show the highest increase in the domestic stock of 
knowledge. Finland, Spain and the Netherlands also show growth rates higher 
than the average. In the opposite side, Australia and Switzerland didn’t increase 
their stock and UK, Norway, Belgium and New Zealand didn’t double the stock. 
The stock of patents in the U.S. shows a slight upward trend until the beginning 
of the 1990s and a sharp upswing afterwards The European countries display a 
different pattern of patenting, with a clear upward trend throughout the Golden 
Age, a flat trend for the period 1970–1990, and a slight increase since 1990. 
The foreign stock of knowledge is computed as the weighted sum of the 
domestic stocks of patents of the trading partners of each country5 Following 
                                                            
4 Using data of citation patents granted for in the U.S., Caballero and Jaffe (1993) find that the 
average annual rate of knowledge or technological obsolescence rises from about 3% at the 
beginning of the century to about 10–12% in 1990. As we are using patent data since 1870 to 
calculate the initial stock of knowledge, we follow Madsen (2007) and apply an average 
depreciation rate of 5% for the whole period. Nonetheless, the literature fails to settle on an 
appropriate depreciation rate. For example, Pakes and Schankerman (1984) advocate a 20% 
depreciation rate. Madsen (2007), on the other hand, tests both depreciation rates and finds no 
significant differences. 
5 Coe and Helpman (1995) and Lichtenberghe and van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie (1998) use 
total imports as the channel for international technology spillovers.  
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Coe et al (1997) and Xu and Wang (1999) the bilateral import weights are 
based on highly technological products, since technological spillovers through 
imports are more likely to take place through imports of technologically 
sophisticated products.  
Contrary to the domestic stock, the evolution of the foreign stock is more 
evenly distributed between countries. Two facts explain this common flat trend 
in the European countries: first, the construction of this variable as an average 
of the domestic stocks of patents for the countries; and, second, the use of a 
weighting procedure that switches the direction of trade of technologically 
advanced products. During this period, in the European countries the direction 
of trade evolved in favour of products coming from other European countries 
and against imports coming from the U.S. This fact had a negative impact on 
the evolution of the international technological spillovers penetrating in Europe 
because the share of imports arriving from the most innovative country 
decreased and the share of imports from the other European countries 
increased even do the domestic stocks of knowledge of the European countries 
remained almost stagnant between 1970–1990. On the other hand, the upward 
trend of the U.S. imports of knowledge could be explained by the increasing 
presence of technologically advanced goods coming from other parts of the 
world, as for example Japan. 
As Coe and Helpman (1995) explain, the transmission of international 
technology spillovers through trade may be proportional to the degree of 
openness of the country. It is therefore of interest to monitor the interaction 
between the foreign stock of knowledge and the country’s average propensity to 
import (mij), in order to account explicitly for the effect of the degree of 
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openness on productivity. In general, the propensity to import has maintained a 
positive slope throughout the whole period, reinforcing the upward trend of the 
foreign stock of knowledge, but there is a wide variety of imports shares among 
countries, both on levels and on growth rates. For example, in Belgium the 
import share in 2007 was over 100 per cent while in Japan and U.S. it was only 
17 per cent. The increase on import shares over the whole period has been 
higher in European countries than in the rest of the sample, and this fact is due 
to the low starting levels in 1953 and to the process of European integration in 
the subsequent years. In contrast, the increase in the imports share in non-
European countries has been below the average. 
Human capital has been measured as the average years of schooling of 
the population by using the Barro and Lee (2013) database. Schooling has 
increased in all countries, with an average gain of 4.5 years in 2007 over 1953. 
The largest increases occurred in Portugal, Italy, Greece, Finland and Spain, 
countries that doubled the years of schooling over the whole period. Moreover, 
in countries with higher initial levels (United States, Switzerland and Australia) 
increases are the lowest of the sample. 
2.2. Data on institutions. 
In recent times, there has been a growing concern in the relevance of 
institutions in economic growth; however, there is no consensus on which 
institutions are relevant and how they influence economic growth. The aim in 
this piece of research is testing if the institutional consensus, named by 
Einchengreen (1996, 2007) as “coordinated capitalism”, influenced the 
observed technology adoption patterns across countries during the second half 
of the XXth century. Coordinated capitalism is defined as the new set of rules 
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and institutions that facilitated the consensus among government, employers 
and workers, and the cooperation among countries after the Second World War 
(new international institutions).  
According to Eichengreen (2007), under the concept of “coordinated 
capitalism” we may find diverse ways for coordination among the social agents 
in a country aiming at creating a socio-political environment more favourable to 
investment and economic growth. Focusing in the particular case of the 
European countries it is possible to observe different ways to obtain 
commitments among the political parties, the unions, firms and the government; 
or, we can observe different rules for the participation of workers in the 
executive boards in private companies; or different ways for dealing with foreign 
countries. These differences in the way of negotiating have lead to different 
policy outcomes, such as the degree of development of the Welfare State or in 
the degree of integration in the international markets of goods and factors.  
The variables we use to represent the “coordinated capitalism” are: social 
conflict, job security, social expenditure openness and external liberalization. 
This selection is the result of data availability (for the whole period and for all 
the sample countries) and the objective to have both institutional and policy 
measures. Three of the variables used capture the existence of a social 
agreement within a country, that help to enjoy more stable environment that 
could favour economic growth and the absorption of foreign technology and 
knowledge. These are social expenditure, employment protection and a low 
degree of social conflict. I what follows, we briefly describe these variables. 
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Social expenditure is measured as the percentage of gross public social 
expenditure on current GDP. The data have been drawn from the OECD (1960-
2007). For the period 1953-1960 we have extrapolate the data from the values 
reported in Flora (1987). Further, in some cases, we have also used domestic 
sources to complete the series.  
Job security is a measure of the workers protection. This protection has 
three components: the law protecting workers with regular contracts, those 
affecting workers with temporary contracts and regulations applying specifically 
to collective dismissal. Employment protection laws and practices seek to 
promote a more stable employment relationship that might benefit both the 
worker and the firm. The worker is compensated for training and other incurred 
costs while the firm can expect more human capital formation and willingness of 
the workers to accept technological changes and internal mobility since jobs are 
not threatened. All of these benefits, however, have to be counterbalanced with 
potential erosions on the worker welfare (protection is effective only for the 
more protected employees) and economic efficiency (low unemployment flows 
and higher unemployment duration). Data on Job Security comes from Allard 
(2005), who extend back to 1950 the series of the Employment Protection 
Legislation Indicator of the OECD. We can observe unregulated labour markets 
during the 1950s and early 1960s, with an increase of the regulations in the 
period 1964-1978. The deregulation wave started in the 1980s. Another 
interesting pattern is the difference between European and non-European 
countries. The non-European, and specially the English speaking countries, 
have less regulated labour markets over the period of analysis. 
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Social conflict is an index that measures the number of working days lost 
per 1000 workers. Data come from Brady et al. (2014), which takes the original 
data from the International Labour Organization. Strikes are a mean to settling 
labour disputes that usually occur when the collective bargaining process fails 
to produce a negotiated agreement. As a way to solve a disagreement, strikes 
are very disruptive and costly. Alternative mechanisms can be adopted, such as 
conciliation, mediation or arbitration. Our view is that strikes are the last option 
to settle a dispute indicates that the alternative possibilities have failed. This 
failure is more probable when worker and management are less coordinated. 
So a lower number of conflicts indicates a more stable employment relationship 
between workers and the firm, which benefits both sides and has a positive 
effect on the efficiency of the economic system. During the 1960s we observe 
relative stability and low number of conflicts, an upsurge in the 1970s and first 
half of the 1980s and a return to low intensity of labour conflicts in the 2000s. 
We use two variables to capture the cooperation between countries and 
the liberalization of external markets: trade openness and the liberalization of 
current and financial external transactions.   
Data for trade openness are drawn from the Penn World Tables. Trade 
openness is computed as the ratio of the sum of exports and imports over GDP. 
There has been a constant increase in trade openness during the whole period 
of analysis, with a maximum for most of the countries during the 2000s. The 
institutional settlements for the post-war recovery (Bretton Woods’s system, 
GATT, Regional Integration) during the 1950s and 1960s and the upsurge of 
globalization and global competition (transport cost reductions, integration of 
communist countries in the WTO) drove the growing tendency. However, the 
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evolution trade openness is asymmetric across countries, and depends on 
domestic characteristics such as the size of the country or the distance to 
international markets or even the level of development. Thus, the U.S., Japan 
and Australia are the less open countries, and Switzerland and Ireland are 
among the most open ones. In the European countries group, Portugal, Greece, 
Spain and France show lowest trade openness ratio, as compared to central 
and northern countries. 
To assess the financial liberalization in international markets we use 
Quinn (1997) quantitative measure of the regulation of international 
financial transactions. This indicator is an index for a government’s policy 
towards capital and financial liberalization by offering a measurement of the 
existence (absence) of restrictions and of the severity of those restrictions. As in 
the trade openness indicator, the trend during this period is towards 
liberalization in the financial markets. Only 6 countries of the sample were not 
fully liberalized in the 2000s (Australia, Austria, France, Sweden, Japan and 
Portugal). The most opened countries (the U.S., the U.K., Germany, Canada or 
Switzerland) reach the maximum level in the 1980s or before. Some European 
countries were fully liberalized in the 1990s and the more backward ones 
(Spain, Greece, Ireland) did not get full liberalization until the 2000s. 
The final step we take on the coordinated capitalism variables it to is to 
normalise the indicators. Summary statistics for the data are presented in Table 
1. 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics. 
  TFP Sd Sf m H 
Liberalization 
Index 
Trade 
Openness 
Social 
Conflict 
Social  
Expenditure
Job 
Security 
Market-Oriented                    
   United Kingdom 0.79 349082.7 592616.1 0.22 11.11 0.77 0.21 0.20 0.44 0.24 
   United States 0.80 1438318 595428.5 0.09 11.8 0.99 0.05 0.19 0.30 0.07 
Continental Europe                    
   Austria 0.85 44234.45 447274.4 0.31 9.88 0.73 0.29 0.02 0.59 0.41 
   Belgium 0.85 40889.26 459451.9 0.73 9.02 0.79 0.53 0.09 0.60 0.4 
   Germany 1.01 393747.7 517227.1 0.27 11.66 0.96 0.19 0.01 0.60 0.53 
   Netherlands 0.86 30714.31 514428.2 0.50 9.84 0.9 0.50 0.03 0.57 0.48 
   Switzerland 0.94 111156.6 479249.5 0.32 11.95 0.98 0.72 0.00 0.36 0.17 
   Australia 0.82 61219.35 953962.8 0.14 11.60 0.66 0.13 0.23 0.28 0.13 
   Canada 1.00 45226.74 1325296 0.26 11.14 0.96 0.23 0.38 0.38 0.14 
   Ireland 0.78 5784.96 625094.5 0.48 8.65 0.73 0.49 0.25 0.41 0.23 
   New Zealand 0.91 17259.74 775630.6 0.23 10.41 0.68 0.24 0.12 0.39 0.13 
Nordic countries                    
   Denmark 0.80 14495.58 409988.4 0.35 10.6 0.77 0.32 0.12 0.57 0.35 
   Finland 0.71 17572.93 484002.1 0.31 9.22 0.65 0.24 0.21 0.51 0.34 
   Norway 0.82 19886.41 443183.3 0.46 10.93 0.67 0.34 0.05 0.46 0.59 
   Sweden 0.79 73663.25 459322.9 0.37 10.55 0.77 0.27 0.05 0.67 0.63 
Mediterranean countries                    
   France 0.90 378634.8 522590.9 0.2 10.74 0.46 0.16 0.07 0.62 0.46 
   Greece 0.89 891.75 503675 0.18 7.68 0.66 0.18 0.41 0.34 0.66 
   Italy 0.92 152108.5 479962.7 0.18 7.87 0.73 0.16 0.45 0.46 0.73 
   Portugal 0.91 1521.75 381578.6 0.24 5.20 0.61 0.23 0.06 0.25 0.61 
   Spain 1.00 60988.83 510706.6 0.16 7.45 0.68 0.13 0.25 0.32 0.68 
Other                    
   Japan 0.83 1239619 978489.5 0.14 10.94 0.64 0.07 0.04 0.27 0.37 
All countries 0.87 214143.6 593293.3 0.29 9.92 0.76 0.27 0.15 0.45 0.40 
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3. The effect of the domestic stock of knowledge and the international 
knowledge spillovers on TFP.  
The objective of this study is to analyse the long-term impact of the stock of 
knowledge, domestic and foreign, measured through the stock of patents, on 
TFP by taking into account the role played by the particular institutional 
framework developed after the WWII. To account for the institutional framework, 
following to Coe et al. (2009), we will analyse how a series of institutional 
variables, specifically adapted to take into account the arrangements adopted 
both within and between countries after the WWII, influence the way innovation 
is incorporated into the economy and its effects over TFP. The question to 
answer is whether this institutional framework had a differential positive impact 
on TFP during the Golden Age when compared with the whole period, and 
whether those set of countries with different degree of development in this 
institutional framework experienced differences in the relationship between 
innovation related variables and TFP growth when compared with a reference 
group of countries (the Anglo-Saxon group).  
First, we present the results of the estimation of the three specifications 
presented in Coe et al. (2009), for the period 1953-2007. The results are 
reported in Table 2. All specifications are estimated by Chiang (2000) Dynamic 
Ordinary Least Squares for Cointegrated Panel Data method.  
In general, the coefficients estimated for the Sd, Sf, H variables are in line 
with Coe and Helpman (1995) and Coe et al. (2009) works. As it can be seen in 
the basic estimation of the Coe and Helpman (1995) model (see column 1 of 
table 2), the domestic stock of knowledge, Sd, has a positive and statistically 
significant effect on TFP. The foreign stock of knowledge, Sf, also has a 
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significant and positive impact on TFP, but its impact is smaller than the impact 
of the domestic stock. When we interact the foreign stock of knowledge with the 
proportion of imports (see column 2), m·Sf, the results remain quite stable, 
although the impact of overseas and domestic stock of knowledge is reduced.  
In column (3), we report the results when we also include a variable of 
human capital, H, as a determinant factor on the evolution of productivity 
(Engelbrencht, 1997). The inclusion of a measure of human capital becomes 
increasingly important, as the time span is larger. This is so as the measures of 
human capital for the economically most advanced countries tend to change 
slowly, but increases significantly for the less advanced countries included in 
the analysis. For example, Spain had an important inversion in human capital 
formation since the 1970's . Our results conﬁrm this hypothesis, which indicates 
that the human capital variable is cointegrated with TFP and with the domestic 
and foreign stocks of knowledge, and that human capital is an important 
determinant of TFP. Column (3) shows the results including the logarithm of 
human capital (H) as an additional explanatory variable. The estimated 
coefficient for human capital is positive and significant, and it is as important as 
the coefficient for the variable Sd. Furthermore, we observe that the impact of 
the stock of foreign knowledge, m·Sf, shrinks when we include the stock of 
human capital. 
Finally, and in a way analogous to Coe et al. (2009), in column (4) we 
include the interaction of the domestic stock of knowledge, the weighted stock 
of foreign knowledge and the human capital variables with the variable G7 
(which takes on value 1 if the country in question belongs to the G7 group and 0 
otherwise). Similarly to Coe et al. (2009), when the interaction of the G7 is 
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included, we get that the coefficient estimated for G7·logSd is smaller (with 
negative sign), indicating that the elasticity of TFP with respect to the variable 
Sd is lower for the G7 countries (0.136) and greater for countries that are not 
part of the G7 (0.139). Further, the elasticity of TFP with respect to the variable 
m·log Sf is not significant for the countries belonging to G7 whereas it is positive 
and significant for countries that are not part of the G7 (0.043). Finally, the 
coefficient estimated for G7·H is larger (with a positive sign) than the 
corresponding to H, indicating that the elasticity of TFP with respect to the 
variable log H is higher for the G7 countries (0.145) and lower for countries that 
are not part of the G7 (0.110)6, being this difference significant at the 15% level 
of significance. 
 
Table 2. Foreign knowledge spillovers, 1953-2007. 
  (1)   (2)   (3)   (4) 
log Sd 0.207*** 0.192*** 0.145*** 0.139*** 
0.009 0.008 0.008 0.010 
log Sf 0.167*** - - - 
 0.011    
m·log Sf  - 0.113** 0.017** 0.043*** 
  0.053 0.007 0.011 
log H  - - 0.127*** 0.110*** 
   0.007 0.007 
G7·log Sd - - - 0.136* 
    0.014 
G7·m·log Sf - - - -0.009 
    0.010 
G7·log H - - - 0.145*** 
    0.013 
Note: ***, **, **, mean significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
 
                                                            
6 The difference between G7·logSd and logSd, m·log Sf and G7·m·log Sf and log H and G7·log 
H are significant at the 15%, 0% and 5% levels of significance, respectively. 
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After checking that the results of our specifications are similar to those 
obtained by Coe et al. (2009), we take a step further and extend our 
specifications to include a series of institutional variables: the effect of the 
quality of the Government, the EU membership and the degree of patent 
protection. 
4. The institutions and the international knowledge spillovers. 
Institutions are increasingly viewed as key determinants of TFP and, hence, of 
economic growth. In this section, we test if the estimated parameters on 
domestic and foreign stock of knowledge, and on human capital vary among 
countries according to various proxies for institutions. Thus we seek to account 
for heterogeneity based on country-specific institutions rather than by estimating 
country-specific parameters based on limited time-series observations. First, we 
focus on four institutions that have been emphasized in the literature: 
- The Ease of doing business, which is an average ranking of countries 
according to the ease of doing the following 10 actions: starting a 
business, dealing with licenses, employing workers, registering property, 
getting credit, protecting investors, paying taxes, trading across borders, 
enforcing contracts, and closing a business (World Bank, 2007). 
- The Quality of tertiary education, which is a composite measure of the 
extent to which tertiary institutions have: freedom to manage resources, 
including the selection of students, autonomy to decide on the sources 
and structure of funding, and staff personnel policies; freedom in setting 
objectives, including deciding on course content; and are accountable, 
including various types of evaluation (Oliveira Martins et al., 2007). 
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- The Strength of intellectual property rights, as measured by an index of 
patent protection (Park and Lippoldt, 2005) 
- The Origins of legal systems in French, German, Scandinavian, or 
English law (La Porta et al., 1999, 2008). 
Each of these institutional variables could potentially affect the degree to 
which domestic and foreign R&D capital affects total factor productivity. In the 
quality ladders approach, for example, a given R&D effort could result in larger 
quality improvements in countries where the quality of tertiary education is 
relatively high since these countries may produce more productive researchers 
than other countries. Similarly, countries where the ease of doing business is 
relatively high or intellectual property rights are well protected may encourage 
more entrepreneurial R&D that results in larger quality improvements for a given 
R&D effort. Different legal systems may also affect the type or productivity of 
R&D. 
Our institutional variables are broad based, and some of them, like the 
ease of doing business, consist of averages of more detailed variables. We feel 
that for our country-level analysis with a sample of 21 countries, broad 
measures provide the appropriate choice. The effects of finer features of 
institutional design can possibly be estimated with a large sample of countries, 
but not with our sample size. For this reason we confine the analysis to the 
broad-based measure of institutions. 
Similarly to Coe et at. (2009), we will start with 2 institutional variables 
that have been used in the literature: ease in doing business and patent 
protection. Further, we will add as institutional variable pertaining to the EU.  
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In a second step, new series of institutional variables will be used to 
better approximate the particular institutional environment developed after the 
WWII and lasted during the second half of the XXth. The variables we have used 
to represent the “coordinated capitalism” are: social conflict, job security, social 
expenditure, trade openness and external liberalization.  
Further, we will investigate the extent to which these variables affect TFP 
by interacting them with the type of country and with the Golden Age period. 
These institutional variables proxy for the particular institutional framework 
established in the developed countries after the WWII. Some authors consider 
that this new institutional order made a difference in the evolution of the 
European countries and Japan with regard to the US (and the UK). This 
difference that was positive during the Golden Age easing the technological 
catch-up with the US, could have turned into a negative influence for innovation 
and technological progress in the last decades. 
Now we explain with details all the institutional variables and the 
interacting variables we use in our empirical exercise. The first institutional 
variable we use is a measure on the ease of carrying out business in countries 
("The ease of doing business"). In particular, we will use the indicator ICRG 
("International Country Risk Guide"). This variable is a measure of the quality of 
a Government (on a scale of 0-1) calculated by the average value of the 
variables "Corruption", "Law and order" and "Quality" of the bureaucracy. Higher 
values indicate better quality of Government. To calculate the indicator ICRG, 
22 variables are used in three sub-categories of risk: political, economic and 
financial. An index for each of the subcategories is calculated first. The political 
risk index is based on 100 points, the financial risk index on 50-point and the 
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economic risk on 50 points. To produce weights to include the country in the 
classification of risk rating, the total number of points of the three indices is 
divided by two. The scores obtained range from zero to 100. From this score, 
countries are divided into categories of very low risk (80 to 100 points) to very 
high risk (zero to 49.9 points). The political risk rating includes 12 variables 
weighted using both political and social attributes. This variable is similar to the 
variable "Easy doing business" of the World Bank (2007). To capture the effect 
of this variable on the coefficients of the determinants of the TFP, we have 
classified the countries into three groups based on the value of the ICRG 
indicator: high, medium and low.  
The second variable that we use to measure the institutional environment 
is the intellectual property rights degree of protection, measured by a patent 
protection index (Park and Lippoldt, 2005).  
The third variable is an indicator that accounts for belonging to the 
European Union (or institutions that preceded, for example the EEC). This 
institutional variable is probably the variable that best picks up the most 
important institutional change for European countries during the Golden Age. 
We believe that given the objective of this study, the EU membership includes 
many of the possible indicators on institutions: ease of doing business, reduced 
financial, economic and other risks, etc. This variable has been calculated as a 
dummy variable taking value 1 from the year in which a country entered the EU. 
Each of these institutional variables could affect the degree that domestic 
and foreign stock of knowledge, and also human capital, affect TFP. As pointed 
out by Coe et al. (2009), in the quality ladders approach, a particular effort in 
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R&D could result in higher quality improvements in countries where the quality 
of tertiary education is relatively high since these countries can produce better 
researchers than other countries. Further, countries where the ease of doing 
business is relatively high or where intellectual property rights are well protected 
can stimulate more entrepreneurial activity, what would imply more patenting 
activity. And this would eventually provide greater improvements on TFP and 
result in higher rates of growth.  
In table 3, we present the results of the estimation for the Ease of doing 
business variable. To facilitate comparisons, the results in the first column are 
the results for the reference specification (fourth column of table 2). The 
estimated coefficients for the interaction of the variable "High ICRG" and 
(domestic and foreign) stock of knowledge are positive and significant. The 
interaction with the human capital variable is not significant. The interactions of 
the variable “Low ICRG” with the 3 determinants of TFP are negative and 
significant. Thus countries where it is relatively easy to do business get greater 
benefits from their own knowledge efforts, Sd, and from the spillovers of 
international knowledge, Sf. Countries where it is relatively difficult to make 
business benefit less by their own domestic knowledge efforts, the spillovers 
from foreign knowledge and the investment in human capital.7 These results 
point out the fact that the different ease of doing business between countries 
produces considerable heterogeneity in the estimated coefficients. 
 
 
                                                            
7 The coefficients for the interactions associated with the high and low IRCG indicators have to 
be interpreted in relation to countries with a medium value. 
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Table 3. The effect of the quality of the Government 
(ICRG), 1953-2007.  
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
log Sd 0.145*** 0.127*** 0.150*** 0.145*** 
0.008 0.011 0.008 0.008 
m·log Sf  0.017*** 0.183*** 0.002 0.017*** 
0.007 0.007 0.012 0.007 
log H  0.127*** 0.124*** 0.128*** 0.132*** 
 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.009 
High ICRG·log Sd - 0.036*** - - 
0.013   
Low ICRG·log Sd - -0.004* - - 
0.003   
High ICRG·m·log Sf - - 0.016** - 
   0.011  
Low ICRG·m·log Sf  - - -0.005*** - 
  0.002  
High ICRG·log H - - - -0.007 
    0.009 
Low ICRG·log H - - - 0.012 
 0.012 
Note: ***, **, **, mean significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
 
The second variable we consider is the degree of patent protection. In 
general, there has been a strengthening of the intellectual property rights in the 
last few decades in all the countries in our sample, see Figure 6 in Coe et al. 
(2009). As indicated by these authors, in general, the variance between 
countries is not large, and the increased protection over time has been most 
pronounced among countries where the protection was initially weaker. In 1971 
the rate of patent protection was in average 2.61, on a scale of 1 to 5, and 
ranged between a minimum of 1.33 in Portugal and a maximum value of 3.83 in 
United States. In 2004 the average had increased to 4.42 and the range of 
values has been reduced to a minimum of 3.48 in Iceland and a maximum of 
4.88 in United States.  
Patent protection is an important determinant for total factor productivity 
in itself, as shown in the second column of table 4. In addition, patent protection 
 25
can also affect TFP through its impact on the stock of domestic knowledge, 
since it can operate as an incentive for innovators to work in risky projects 
where the potential profitability is higher. Therefore the strengthening of the 
protection of patents can result in a social stock of domestic knowledge that has 
a greater impact on TFP. Our results confirm this hypothesis (see column 2 in 
table 4), as we obtain that countries where patent protection is relatively greater 
obtain a higher benefit from their domestic stock of knowledge (the coefficient 
for the interaction of the protection of patents variable and log Sd is positive and 
significant) and a lower benefit from the foreign stock of knowledge (the 
coefficient associated with the interaction of the protection of patents variable 
and m·log Sf is negative and significant), as compared to countries where patent 
protection is relatively weak. 
Table 4. The effect of patent protection on TFP, 1953-
2007.  
 (1) (2) 
log Sd 0.145*** 0.105*** 
 0.008 0.009 
m·log Sf  0.017*** 0.049*** 
 0.007 0.013 
log H  0.127*** 0.088*** 
 0.007 0.008 
Patent protection*log Sd - 0.008*** 
  0.002 
Patent protection*m·log Sf - -0.011*** 
  0.003 
Patent protection - 0.316*** 
  0.068 
Note: ***, **, **, mean significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
 
Finally, in table 5 we present the results of the interactions of the dummy 
variable EU with the domestic and foreign stocks of knowledge variables and 
the human capital variable. The coefficients of the interaction of the EU variable 
and the (domestic and foreign) stocks of knowledge variables are positive and 
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significant, while the interaction with human capital is not significant. Therefore, 
these results indicate that pertaining to the EU reinforces the impact of stocks of 
knowledge on TFP. We interpret this effect in a similar way to the variable ease 
of doing business. The EU is an economic and political area where the 
institutional environment has been developed significantly, improving the 
conditions for carrying out business by companies. This is reflected both in the 
domestic knowledge stock variable and on the impact of the foreign knowledge 
spillovers.  
Table 5. The effect of the UE, 1953-2007.  
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
log Sd 0.145*** 0.145*** 0.145*** 0.145*** 
0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008 
m log Sf  0.017*** 0.014** 0.014** 0.016*** 
0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 
log H  0.127*** 0.119*** 0.120*** 0.132*** 
 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.008 
UE*log Sd - 0.004*** - - 
0.001   
UE *m log Sf  - - 0.003*** - 
   0.001  
UE*log H - - - 0.003 
 0.005 
Note: ***, **, **, mean significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
 
The second group of institutional variables we introduce in our analysis are: 
social conflict, job security, social expenditure, capital liberalization and trade 
openness.8  
In table 6 below we present the results using this set of variables. We 
report in column (1) the results of our baseline specification. From column (2) to 
(5) we introduce each variable in turn. The four variables have a positive and 
                                                            
8 The variable trade openness might be in conflict with the variable m·logSf and therefore in 
some specifications we do not include it. 
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significant effect on TFP. Further, the coefficients for the main variables in our 
analysis (i.e., Sd, m·Sf and H) remain quite stable and maintain their statistical 
significance. However, when we introduce the variables job security or social 
expenditure the variable m·Sf loses its significance. Finally, in columns (6) we 
enter all the above variable altogether. Although the variables Sd and H still 
maintain its sign and statistical significance, the coefficient for m·Sf reverses its 
sign. Further, the institutional variables Social conflict and Social Expenditure 
are no longer significant. 
Table 6. Institutional variables, 1953-2007. 
    (1)    (2)    (3)   (4)   (5)   (6) 
log Sd   0.145***  0.146***  0.159*** 0.148*** 0.139***   0.153***
  0.008  0.008  0.007  0.007  0.007   0.007 
m·log Sf    0.017**  0.018**  -0.001  0.002  0.012*  -0.005 
  0.007  0.007  0.007  0.007  0.007   0.007 
log H    0.127***  0.126***  0.088***
 
0.092*** 
 
0.088***   0.053***
  0.007  0.007  0.007  0.009  0.008   0.009 
Social conflict -  0.018** - - -   0.013 
   0.009      0.009 
Job security - - 0.239*** - -   0.216***
   0.019     0.021 
Social expenditure - - - 
 
0.224*** -   0.025 
     0.032    0.033 
Capital liberalization - - - 
-  
0.206***   0.185***
      0.103   0.023 
Note: ***, **, **, mean significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
 
5. Institutional variables and varieties of capitalism 
In the following exercise we have grouped the countries according to the 
Amable (2003) classification of capitalistic economies in five groups9 (see Table 
                                                            
9 Following Amable (2003), we classify as: market based economies the United Kingdom and 
the United States, as social democratic countries Denmark, Norway, Sweden and Finland, as  
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11): Market-based Anglo-Saxon economies, Social-Democratic model, 
Continental European model, Mediterranean model, Nordic model and Asian 
model. To make this classification Amable (2003) considers five fundamental 
institutional areas: product-market competition; the wage–labour nexus and 
labour-market institutions; the financial intermediation sector and corporate 
governance; social protection and the Welfare State; and the education sector. 
Different economic models are not simply characterized by different institutional 
forms, but also by particular patterns of interaction between complementary 
institutions which are the core characteristics of these models.  
Since the beginning of the 1990s it has been observed an inferior 
macroeconomic performance in continental Europe and the remaining models 
compared to the Anglo-Saxon economies. The non-Anglo-Saxon economies 
have been alleged to have too rigid markets to adapt their firms to the new 
international competitive scenario and to react to technological change. More 
specifically, they find difficulties to generate innovation and to catch-up with the 
technological change developed by the leading economies, especially the 
United States10.  
In what follows, we interact the Amable’s classification of models of 
capitalism with the knowledge variables in our analysis. Thus, to interpret the 
results, we use as reference the group of Market based countries. In these 
                                                                                                                                                                              
continental European countries Austria, Belgium, Germany, Ireland, Netherlands and 
Switzerland, as Mediterranean countries France, Italy, Greece, Portugal and Spain, and as 
Asian countries Japan. As pointed out by Amable (2003) Canada, Australia and New Zealand 
are similar to continental European countries and thus we include them in that group of 
countries. 
10  There is a vast literature that stress the still poor assimilation in Europe of the ICT 
technologies as compared with the U.S. (Van Ark et al, 2003; Colecchia and Schreyer, 2001; 
Vijselar and Albers, 2002; Timmer and Van Ark, 2005).;  
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specifications with interactions, the coefficients for the main variables capture 
the effect of these variables for the reference category (Market based countries) 
and the interactions coefficients should be added to (if they have a positive and 
significant value) or subtracted from (should they have a negative and 
significant coefficient) the base coefficients. In column (1) of table 7 we report 
the results for the main variables and the country type interactions. In columns 
2-4 we add to the first specification the institutional variables.  
So, for the stock of domestic knowledge we get a significant and positive 
effect on TFP (with a value of 14.2%), which corresponds to the effect for the 
Market based countries. This effect is the same for the Social democratic, 
Continental Europe and Mediterranean groups as none of the interactions with 
the domestic stock of knowledge is statistically significant. This means that the 
particularities of the institutional framework do not make a difference in the 
elasticities of TFP with regard to domestic innovation in the tree groups of 
European countries with regard to the Anglo-Saxon economies. However, for 
the Asian economies the domestic stock of knowledge has a large, positive and 
significant effect (64.8%, i.e. 14.2% plus 50.6%). In this case we have to take 
into account that Japan in the only country included in the Asian group and that 
this country has exhibited the highest propensity to apply for new patents in the 
whole sample. We obtain this result even after scaling down the Japan stock of 
patents to correct this bias introduced by the particularities of the Japan 
patenting system. This result reflects one of the particularities of the Japan after 
the WWII such is the articulation of a strong coordination between the 
government, the academic system and the big corporations conducive to 
generate an endogenous capacity to innovate (Freeman, 1987). 
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As regards, the foreign knowledge stock effect, we get a positive and 
significant effect (4.5%) for the reference group of countries (Market Based). 
This effect gets reinforced for the Continental Europe group (the effect is 8.1%), 
and gets reduced for the Mediterranean and Asian groups (with effects -17.3% 
and -18.4%, respectively). The significant and negative sign that we find for 
some coefficients of the non-Anglo-Saxon countries compared with the market-
based economies could be associated with the lower investment in Europe in 
new technologies as compared with the U.S. and the U.K. that is still too low to 
generate the spillover effects coming from innovation generated abroad (van 
Ark and Timmer, 2005). For example, network externalities depend crucially on 
a critical mass of users of the new technologies and on organizational changes 
in the firms in order to assimilate the technologies developed by others in their 
particular environments (Oulton, 2002). 
The third variable we include in our specifications is human capital. We 
get a positive and significant effect for the Marked based economies (10.7%). 
This effect increases both for the Social Democratic and Mediterranean 
countries (with values 16.1% and 27.8%, respectively). However, the impact of 
human capital although still positive and significant gets reduced for the 
Continental Europe (5.0%) and even gets negative for the Asian group (-5.4%). 
In the case of the continental Europe this differences disappears when we 
include control institutional variables. Again the results are mixed. By the one 
hand we find that those countries that had made a stronger effort to increase 
their stock of human capital since the 1950s, measured as average years of 
schooling, had found higher returns to education, such as the case of the 
Mediterranean countries. By contrary, those groups of countries with attainment 
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levels more close to the reference group, such as the Continental Europe do not 
present any significant difference with the Anglo-Saxon group or it is very weak 
in the case of the Nordic group. 
Table 7. Country classification and institutional variables, 1953-2007. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
log Sd 0.142**   0.131** 0.125* 0.131** 
0.072 0.066 0.066 0.064 
m·log Sf  0.045***   0.065*** 0.061*** 0.064*** 
0.015 0.013 0.014 0.013 
log H  0.107***   0.028* 0.021 0.021 
0.017 0.017 0.017 0.016 
log Sd·Social Dem. 0.029 -0.004 -0.016 0.003 
0.075 0.069 0.069 0.067 
log Sd·Continental E. -0.067 -0.066 -0.084 -0.098 
0.073 0.067 0.067 0.065 
log Sd·Mediterranean 0.088 0.145** 0.148** 0.105* 
0.073 0.068 0.067 0.066 
log Sd·Asian 0.506*** 0.438*** 0.436*** 0.398*** 
0.096 0.089 0.088 0.086 
m·log Sf·Social Dem. -0.010 -0.054** -0.058** -0.069*** 
0.024 0.023 0.023 0.022 
m·log Sf·Continental E. 0.036** -0.037** -0.048*** -0.038** 
0.018 0.018 0.018 0.017 
m·log Sf·Mediterranean -0.213*** -0.214*** -0.225*** -0.200*** 
0.030 0.028 0.028 0.027 
m·log Sf·Asian -0.234*** -0.253*** -0.263*** -0.246*** 
0.043 0.040 0.039 0.038 
log H·Social Dem. 0.054** 0.062*** 0.064*** 0.077*** 
0.022 0.020 0.020 0.020 
log H·Continental E. -0.057*** 0.010 0.011 0.014 
0.020 0.020 0.020 0.019 
log H·Mediterranean 0.171*** 0.128*** 0.126*** 0.128*** 
0.026 0.025 0.024 0.024 
log H·Asian -0.646*** -0.510*** -0.495*** -0.458*** 
0.087 0.081 0.080 0.079 
Social conflict - 0.017** 0.019*** - 
0.008 0.007 
Job security - 0.218*** 0.204*** - 
0.020 0.020 
Social expenditure - -0.047 -0.033 -0.075** 
0.032 0.035 0.031 
Capital liberalization - 0.208*** 0.214*** 0.252*** 
0.023 0.023 0.023 
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Trade openness - - 0.266*** 0.283*** 
0.053 0.052 
Social conflict 1960-1990 - - - 0.006 
    0.008 
Social conflict rest - - - -0.036 
0.029 
Job security 1970-1990 - - - 0.200*** 
0.020 
Job security rest - - - 0.124*** 
    0.023 
Note: ***, **, **, mean significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
 
 
In the third exercise we take into account the special period of the 
Golden Age (see Table 8). For that purpose, we create a dummy variable that 
accounts for this period and that is interacted both with the main variables (the 
foreign and domestic stocks of knowledge and the human capital variable) and 
the institutional variables. In general we get that the Golden Age period 
reinforces the effects found for the variables of interest and the effects of the 
institutional variables. In particular, we observe that the effect of the domestic 
stock of knowledge effect (that is significant and positive, with an effect of 
15.2%) increases by 12.2% during the Golden Age period, being the total effect 
27.4%. The effect of the foreign stock of knowledge is not significant off the 
Golden Age period, but turns positive and significant (with an effect of 1.7%) 
during the Golden Age. Finally, the effect of human capital gets also reinforced 
by 4.9% during the Golden Age (the effect goes from 2.8% to 7.7%). 
As regards the institutional variables, we get that the better the social 
conflict the higher the effect (positive and significant) on TFP during the Golden 
Age (this coefficient is not significant outside this period). For the variable job 
security, we get a positive and significant effect that is reinforced during the 
Golden Age period (the effect increases from 22.5% to 42.0%). For the social 
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security index we also get that the variable is significant and positive during the 
Golden Age (with an effect of 15.5% on TFP), although it was not significant 
outside this period. The institutional variable capital liberalization, which has a 
positive and significant effect (13.9%) also gets reinforced during the Golden 
Age period (being the effect 7.2% larger). Finally, we get that the variable trade 
openness, with a positive and significant effect on TFP, does not have an extra 
effect during the Golden Age.11 
Table 8. Institutional variables and the Golden 
Age, 1953-2007. 
log Sd 0.152*** 
0.080 
m·log Sf  0.009 
0.009 
log H  0.028** 
0.011 
log Sd·Golden Age 0.122*** 
0.008 
m·log Sf·Golden Age 0.017** 
0.008 
log H·Golden Age 0.049*** 
0.009 
Social conflict -0.002 
0.009 
Job security 0.225*** 
0.029 
Social expenditure -0.024 
0.038 
Capital liberalization 0.139*** 
0.055 
Trade openness 0.116** 
0.030 
Social conflict·Golden Age 0.043** 
0.017 
Job security·Golden Age 0.195*** 
0.026 
Social expenditure·Golden Age 0.155*** 
0.045 
                                                            
11 However, it is probable that the effect of this variable is captured in the interaction of imports 
and foreign stock of knowledge. 
 34
Capital liberalization·Golden Age 0.072*** 
0.067 
Trade openess·Golden Age 0.330 
0.030 
Note: ***, **, **, mean significant at 1%, 5% and 
10%, respectively. 
 
4. Conclusions 
This study compares the relationship between TFP and innovation-
related variables (domestic stock of knowledge, imports of knowledge, and 
human capital) for 21 OECD countries between 1953 and 2007 after controlling 
for specific institutional characteristics. To conduct our analysis we use the 
same econometric approach as Coe, Helpman and Hoffmaister (2009), but 
taking into account a new set of institutional variables. The new set has been 
specifically tailored to measure the post WWII institutional framework 
characterized by the development of the Welfare State and by an increasing 
exposure of countries to international competence.  
These selected variables let us to proxy the particular institutional 
environment opened after WWII which has been called “coordinated capitalism” 
(Eichengreen, 2007). Some authors consider that these new institutional order 
has marked a difference in the evolution of the European countries and Japan 
with regard to the US (and the UK). This difference that was positive during the 
Golden Age easing the technological catch-up with the US, could have turned 
into negative for innovation and technological progress in the last decades. The 
variables we have used to represent the “coordinated capitalism” are social 
conflict, job security, social expenditure, openness and external liberalization.  
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We have estimated several sets of econometric specifications. First, we 
have entered in the analysis the same set of institutional variables than Coe, 
Helpman and Hoffmaister (2009): the ease of doing business, the quality of 
tertiary education, the strength of intellectual property rights and the origins of 
legal systems (French, German, Scandinavian, or English law). The results 
confirm that countries where it is relatively difficult to make business benefit less 
by their own domestic knowledge efforts, the spillovers from foreign knowledge 
and the investment in human capital. Countries where patent protection is 
relatively greater obtain a higher benefit from their domestic stock of knowledge  
and a lower benefit from the foreign stock of knowledge, as compared to 
countries where patent protection is relatively weak. Therefore, these results 
indicate that pertaining to the EU reinforces the impact of stocks of knowledge 
on TFP. 
Second, we deal with the set of institutional variables representative of 
the “coordinated capitalism” developed after WWII by estimating the differential 
impact of innovation related variables over productivity during the Golden Age 
when compared with the whole period 1953-2007. In general, we get that those 
variables with a positive effect on TFP find their effect reinforced during the 
Golden Age. The better the social conflictivity, the higher the positive effect on 
TFP during the Golden Age (this coefficient is not significant outside this 
period). For job security, we get a positive and significant effect that is 
reinforced during the Golden Age period. For the social security index we also 
get that the variable is significant and positive during the Golden Age, although 
it was not significant outside this period. Capital liberalization, which has a 
positive and significant effect, also gets reinforced during the Golden Age 
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period. Finally, we get that the variable trade openness, with a positive and 
significant effect on TFP, does not have an extra effect during the Golden Age. 
Third, when countries are grouped according to their similarities in the set 
of institutions representative of the post-war framework (Amable, 2006), we find 
significant differences among them. In general, there are not significant 
differences between the different groups and the market oriented economies 
with regard to the elasticity of TFP to indoors innovation, with the exception of 
Japan where this impact is huger. However, the results suggest that in Anglo-
Saxon market oriented economies, international spillovers have a higher impact 
on TFP than in the rest of European economies and Japan. This means that 
economies more opened to international competition are more sensitive to 
innovation developed abroad because they have to compete with foreign 
producers and because the improvements in product quality developed by 
others will be embodied as inputs in the domestic production processes.  
Additionally, the elasticity of TFP to human capital tends to be higher in 
the Mediterranean and Nordic economies than in the market-oriented and 
Continental European economies. Possibly this result is biased by the way of 
measuring the human capital variable, such as average years of school. The 
reason is that this variable has increased more in the Mediterranean economies 
since the WWII because they started the period from a lower level than the rest 
the countries. In the case of Japan this variable exhibits a high negative 
coefficient, possibly to counterbalance the high positive effect of domestic 
knowledge. 
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The results of our study highlight some noticeable differences in the way 
knowledge-related variables influenced overall productivity in countries with 
different combinations of institutions. Current technologies are highly intensive 
in knowledge and European countries must confront the stagnation in their 
overall productivity levels by reinforcing the ways knowledge in entered in the 
economy. For this reason, efforts in education have demonstrated to be 
effective in incrementing the TFP, but possibly it would be necessary to go on 
with the efforts to upgrading workers until to reach levels similar to the U.S. and 
the U.K. Similarly, the weak point of the non-market economies is their low 
elasticity with regard to international spillovers of technology and more effort 
should make to ease the arrival of innovation developed abroad.  
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